The former British diplomat, Timothy Less, says no relatively lenient sanctions imposed by the West will be enough to block Russia.

Less, in an interview for KosovaPress said that the sanctions will also have to be accompanied by sustained military support for the Ukrainian resistance, to the point that it could cause real and lasting damage to Russian troops on the ground. Meanwhile, regarding the concerns that the countries of the Western Balkans may face situations that generate destabilization, Less says that it depends on how events will unfold in Ukraine, as Russia has two basic goals in the Balkans. One is to block NATO enlargement and the other is to create problems for the West by maintaining a low level of instability, especially in Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. Full interview: KosovaPress: What awaits the world we have known so far, after Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, or: how should Putin be stopped? Less: I’m not sure Russia can be stopped, at least without a change in the mindset of the West, and a reorganisation of our societies, economies and militaries. After the end of the Cold War, the West cut its spending on defence, made its economies dependent on states such as Russia and gave up thinking about geopolitics. Instead, it became obsessed with second-order threats such as international terrorism and treated foreign policy as a medium for promoting liberal values such as democracy and human rights rather than upholding its core interests. Potentially, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may shake the West out of its torpor, but we will have to see. In the meantime, what we can say for sure about what awaits the world is that Russia will establish a clear sphere of influence which includes Ukraine. KosovaPress: Its consequences, for now, are difficult to predict, but there are many voices, especially security experts, who express concern that even a new European war cannot be ruled out. Do you think that today began the most difficult days for Europe since the end of World War II? Less: I think a pan-European war is unlikely, despite attempts by some to depict current events as analogous to Europe in the late-1930s. The current drama is contained within the borders of Ukraine and violence is unlikely to spread further. Potentially, neighbouring states such as Poland, Romania and Moldova might act as conduits for the supply of weapons to the Ukrainians, meaning Russia takes steps to block them on their borders or engage in hybrid warfare against them. However, there are no grounds for assuming a wider conflagration as happened during World War II, which concerned an aggressor state, Germany, that was geographically located in the centre of the continent with territorial ambitions over the whole of Europe, and surrounded by other countries such as Hungary and Croatia which had an interest in supporting Germany to achieve their particular political goals. I do think Europe is heading for its most difficult days since World War II, but this is not specifically because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That is only one aspect of a larger breakdown in Europe’s political order. Equally as important are the slow-motion collapse of the European Union, the culture war raging in western Europe and the rise of other challenger powers such as China and Turkey. KosovaPress: The Western bloc responds to Russia with sanctions and it is also expected that sanctions against Russia will be severe, but my question is will sanctions alone be enough for a Russia that in fact violated the entire written international order and rules? Less: No sanctions will not be enough to block Russia, certainly not of the relatively mild kind that the West has imposed so far. For sanctions to have an effect, they must be sufficiently robust and comprehensive to create serious hardship for the Russian government, to the point where it cannot provide welfare for the population or pay the army. For the moment, I don’t see much prospect of this. Europe is dependent on trade with Russia, in particular for supplies of energy. If it is going to impose meaningful sanctions, it must first find alternative suppliers which cannot be achieved quickly and may not be possible at all. Sanctions would also need to be accompanied by sustained military support for the Ukrainian resistance, to the point that it can inflict real and sustained harm to Russian troops on the ground. Again, this is a process. I suspect the formal army will be defeated in the coming days, meaning Ukrainians must then form an informal resistance to which the West can supply lethal weaponry via Poland, Romania and Moldova. Potentially, this could replicate the situation in Afghanistan in the 1980s where the Russians took enough casualties that they eventually withdrew. However, all this is speculative, and dependent on the ability of the Ukrainians to form a resistance movement, of the West to back them and of Russia to give up the fight over an issue which it considers to be existential. Unless Russia can be defeated, then a return to some sort of normality in Ukraine means the West must reach a diplomatic solution, and that probably means meeting Russia’s demand that the country does not join NATO. KosovaPress: Is it possible for the West to provide military assistance to Ukraine in order to stop Putin, and is it possible for NATO to prepare for a military confrontation on its borders as well? For example, in Poland. Less: The US and UK, among others, are preparing for a confrontation on NATO’s borders by reinforcing their military deployment. However, the key point is that Russia has no interest in expanding the conflict to countries such as Romania, Poland or the Baltic States. Its concern is to preserve its strategic buffer in Ukraine, and it will only confront these countries if it is forced to – which I think is unlikely. KosovaPress: Since I am from Kosovo, that is, it belongs to the Western Balkans region, a region also with tensions and our audience here in the Balkans is concerned that Russia could use its ally Serbia to destabilize the region. As much as possible for the developments in Ukraine to have a chain impact in the Balkans as well, e.g., in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, are these countries more exposed to Russia's interest in destabilizing? Less: It depends how events pan out in Ukraine. Russia has two basic goals in the Balkans. One is to block the expansion of NATO and the other is to create problems for the West by maintaining a state of low-level instability, above all in Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. Both of these goals can be achieved by supporting the Serbs in their quest to resolve their unresolved national question, while denying them the satisfaction of actually doing so. This is clear from Russia’s opposition to Republika Srpska’s independence or of any resolution of the Kosovo conflict, whatever form that takes. I don't see any prospect of change to the first of these goals. Russia will continue to oppose NATO’s expansion in any scenario. However, the question of Russian efforts to destabilise the Balkans could change. The more Russia feels vulnerable in Ukraine, the more likely it is to try and destabilise the Balkans; in extremis, it could encourage the Bosnian Serbs to declare their independence, although it is not certain the Serbs would respond to this. Conversely, the more relaxed Russia feels about Ukraine, the less motivated it is likely to be to cause problems for the West in the Balkans. KosovaPress: I know that you are experts on the Balkan issue, and I am interested in your point of view, on Serbia's approach to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Less: The main reason why Serbia is reluctant to criticise Russia is because it relies on Russian support for its position on Kosovo and doesn’t want to risk losing this support. Buttressing this reluctance is residual sympathy for Russia as a traditional sponsor of Serbia’s interests and as a state which experienced a similar sundering of its population after the collapse of the Soviet Union. That doesn’t mean Serbia supports what has happened in Ukraine. On the contrary, I suspect most politicians in Belgrade disapprove of Russia’s actions. Nor does it mean Serbia and Russia’s interests are completely aligned. Serbia cannot accept territorial revisionism of the kind Russia is pursuing in Ukraine because of its wish to retain Kosovo. It also has obligations to the West which are important. They point is that Serbia cannot say any of this without alienating Russia, so it won’t. It is worth adding that the Bosnian Serbs have also not condemned Russia, although their interests are slightly at variance with Serbia’s. They do support territorial revisionism and civic groups like the ‘Choice is Ours’ have called for recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk. Dodik too has expressed his solidarity by meeting the Russian ambassador to Sarajevo, offering his sympathy for Russia’s position and complaining about the Bosniaks’ support for Ukraine. However, Dodik is afraid that more overt support for Russia might cause more problems for Republika Srpska so he has not gone further than this – at least for now.